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that the time limitations provided by Uniform Commercial Code
§ 2-725 for breach of warranty were inapplicable. The court,
however, deemed the suit to be for breach of warranty 6 and held
that it was untimely.
The court reasoned that although persons whose use of an
article is contemplated may take advantage of a manufacturer's
implied warranty, nevertheless, the statute of limitations begins
to run against them when the breach occurs, i.e., at the time of
sale or installation. Contrary reasoning would mean that a manufacturer would be liable for breach of warranty to a contemplated user ad infinitum, whereas the vendee would be limited
to the statutory period.
A different approach to "strict tort liability" was taken in
Wilsey v. Sam Mulkey Co. 7 Plaintiff commenced an action for
personal injuries in 1965 arising out of an accident that occurred
in 1963. The alleged cause of the accident was an improperly
manufactured hay elevator which was sold by the defendant manufacturer in 1956. In a lengthy opinion which cites the arguments
of plaintiff's and defendant's counsel extensively, the court concluded that plaintiff's cause for "strict tort liability" sounded in
tort. The cause of action was thus held to accrue at the time
of the accident allowing the plaintiff three years therefrom to
commence his action.
Does "strict tort liability" sound in warranty, or in tort, or
is it a hybrid theory? Should a plaintiff be allowed the substantive
advantage of proving a warranty cause of action and the procedural advantage of tort accrual rules in such a suit? With
conflicting lower court decisions now available, it would be advisable to watch carefully for the first appellate court authority
on the subject.
CPLR 208.:

Running tolled for disability once commenced will
continue despite return of disability.

If certain disabilities, for example, insanity or imprisonment,
exist at the time a cause of action accrues, running of the statute
of limitations is tolled. It is settled law, however, that once the
disability is removed, the time period of the statute will begin to
run and continue to run notwithstanding return of the disability s
Jordan v. State 9 is an illustration of this proposition. Claimant Jordan filed a claim, in 1964, for damages for wrongful
65It is not accepted that "strict tort liability" is either warranty or tort.
See, e.g., Miller, Significant New Concepts of Tort Liability-Strict Liability,
17 SYRAcusE L. Rnv. 25 (1965).
756 Misc. 2d 480, 289 N.Y.S.2d 307 (Sup. Ct. Delaware County 1968).
8
See Gershinsky v. State, 6 App. Div. 2d 964, 966, 176 N.Y.S.2d 667,
670, aff'd, 6 N.Y.2d 798, 159 N.E.2d 681, 188 N.Y.S.2d 190 (1959).
956 Misc. 2d 1032, 290 N.Y.S.2d 621 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY

detention based upon an improper judgment of conviction for
The parties stipulated that
second degree burglary in 1943.
claimant's imprisonment provided a toll until 1959. In 1959 the
claimant was released on parole, but was subsequently reincarcerated eight months later for a parole violation. The court
held that the two year period of limitation prescribed by the
Court of Claims Act began to run upon claimant's release on
parole and continued to run despite claimant's subsequent reincarceration. The action was thus time barred.
ARTICLE 3 -

JURISDICTION AND SEavICE, APPEARANCE AND CHOICE

OF COURT

CPLR 302.: Possible extension in matrimonial actions.
In Venizelos v. Venizelos,' 0 a separation action, the appellate
division, second department, affirmed the denial of defendant
husband's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and
the allowance of wife's cross-motion for an injunction with
respect to husband's proceedings in Greece. It was found that
the defendant who was married in New York, where the matrimonial domicile was maintained for nine years and where the
children of the marriage resided, was subject to personal jurisdiction although he had returned to his native Greece.
While there is authority for holding that the preparation
and execution of a separation agreement is a transaction of business which will subject an absentee spouse to in personam jurisdiction as to causes of action arising out of it,"" there was no
separation agreement mentioned here. The court stated:
whether defendant was a domiciliary of New York or not at the time
of commencement of this action, it is our opinion that his contacts with
this State and the interests of New York in the litigation are sufficient
to subject him, under the appropriate statutes, to the jurisdiction of our
courts in an action for separation. . . . It was proper . . . to enjoin
defendant from taking any steps to enforce 2the foreign decree and from
instituting an action for divorce in Greece.1
Thus, it appears that a new extension of long-arm jurisdiction
is about to be charted.
The court, however, refused to base its decision entirely on
such tenuous grounds. It was held that the defendant had waived

1030 App. Div. 2d 856, 293 N.Y.S.2d 20 (2d Dep't 1968).
11See 7B McKINNEY's CPLR 302, supp. commentary, 104, 106-07 (1967).
12 30 App. Div. 2d 856, 293 N.Y.S.2d 20, 21 (2d Dep't 1968).

